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ABSTRACT 
 
In 20 the years after the genocide that afflicted Rwanda, the country has made 
considerable progress towards developing human resources in the public sector. It has 
kick-started its economy and improved sectors such as public health and education. 
There is still a need to attract direct foreign investment to boost the economy even 
further.  
However, Rwanda needs to take precautionary measures to ensure that it does not 
fall prey to economic criminality which will impede its economic progress. The fact of 
the matter is that young transitional democracies are prone to attract economic 
delinquents who take advantage of loopholes in the law to advance their criminal 
goals. This is particularly so in a country such as Rwanda, where the government has 
to prioritise other pressing needs that must be addressed. 
This paper assesses the extent to which Rwanda is prepared to deal with the menace 
of money laundering, a threat that may well stunt its ambitions to build a strong 
economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
It is by the Grace and Love of God that today I can look back and say ‘I made it’. This 
research paper is a fruit of combined efforts by people whom I wish to acknowledge 
My gratitude goes to DAAD for its financial support for my studies, both in Cape Town 
and Berlin. 
To my Supervisor, Prof Lovell Fernandez, for his patience, valuable criticism and 
incisive guidance during the writing of this dissertation.  
To other Lecturers namely: Prof Werle, Prof Koen and Dr Moritz. Their wisdom has 
contributed to making me a kind of person I have become today. 
To Jean and Windell, for their time and constructive advice on my research paper. 
To my family and friends, you are the reason why I strive to move forward. 
To all the above named persons who touched my life in different ways and other 
persons whom I could not mention, God bless you. 
 
 
                                                                                 Francis Dusabe 
                                                                                       Cape Town, South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
AML:                 Anti-money laundering.  
FT:                 Financing of Terrorism.  
ML:                 Money laundering. 
FSRB:                  FATF Style Regional Body. 
ESAAMLG:                Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group. 
EAC:                   East African Community. 
DRC:                  Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
FATF:                  Financial Action Task Force. 
UNGA:                 United Nations General Assembly. 
Palermo Convention: United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime. 
UNCAC:                 United Nations Convention against Corruption. 
FIU:                 Financial Investigation Unit 
DNFBP:               Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
USD:                United States Dollars 
NPPA:                  National Public Prosecution Authority 
RNP:                 Rwanda National Police. 
PEP:                  Politically Exposed Person 
NPO:                 Non-profit Organisation 
Rwf:                                Rwandan Francs 
       
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 DECLARATION ......................................................................................................... ii 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................. iv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS .................................................................................................. v 
KEY WORDS ............................................................................................................. x 
CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT RWANDA AND THE EXTENT OF MONEY 
LAUNDERING ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 The State of Money Laundering in Rwanda ...................................................................... 2 
1.3 Country Facts .................................................................................................................... 5 
1.4 An Overview of the Rwandan Legal System ..................................................................... 7 
1.5 Rwanda in the Great Lakes ............................................................................................... 7 
1.5.1 Regional Security .................................................................................................... 7 
1.5.2 Who Benefits from the Minerals? .......................................................................... 9 
1.6 The Overall Crime Situation in Rwanda .......................................................................... 10 
1.7 Why Rwanda Needs Strong Anti-Money Laundering Laws ............................................ 12 
1.8 Structure of the Study ..................................................................................................... 14 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
UNDERSTANDING MONEY LAUNDERING: CONCEPT AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ...... 15 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 15 
2.2 Understanding Money Laundering ................................................................................. 16 
2.3 International Instruments Meant to Fight Money Laundering ....................................... 18 
2.4 The Rwandan Anti-Money Laundering Legal Regime ..................................................... 22 
2.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 25 
CHAPTER THREE 
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ML RESPONSES IN RWANDA ............................. 26 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 26 
  3.2 The Legal Responses ....................................................................................................... 26 
3.2.1 Scope of Criminalisation ....................................................................................... 26 
3.2.2 Elements of the Crime of Money Laundering in Rwanda ..................................... 28 
3.2.3 Extra-Territorial Application of the AML Laws ..................................................... 29 
3.2.4 Dealing with Criminal Proceeds ............................................................................ 31 
3.2.5 Identification and Protection of Property Subject to Provisional Measures ........ 34 
3.2.6 The Fate of the Confiscated Property and the Protection of Third Party Interests34 
3.2.7 Cross Border Movement of Cash .......................................................................... 35 
3.2.8 Aligning Rwanda’s Legal System to FATF Standards............................................. 36 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
3.3 Anti-Money Laundering Coordination and Institutional Framework ............................. 38 
3.3.1 The Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) ................................................................... 38 
3.3.2 National Public Prosecutor Authority (NPPA)....................................................... 40 
3.3.3 Rwanda National Police (RNP): Economic and Financial Unit .............................. 40 
3.3.4 The Office of the Ombudsman ............................................................................. 41 
3.3.5 Revenue Service: Investigation Department ........................................................ 41 
3.4 Preventive Measures ...................................................................................................... 42 
3.4.1 Preventive Measures in Financial institutions ...................................................... 42 
3.4.2 Preventive Measures in Designated Non-Financial Businesses and  Professions 45 
3.5 Customer Due Diligence (CDD) ....................................................................................... 48 
3.6 Cooperation .................................................................................................................... 49 
3.6.1 Domestic Cooperation .......................................................................................... 49 
3.6.2 International Cooperation .................................................................................... 50 
3.6.3 Mutual Legal Assistance ....................................................................................... 51 
3.6.4 Membership in International and Regional Bodies .............................................. 52 
3.7 Impediments to Prosecution of Money Laundering In Rwanda ..................................... 52 
3.7.1 Overview ............................................................................................................... 52 
3.7.2 Stated Challenges in Prosecuting Money Laundering .......................................... 53 
3.7.3 Observed Challenges of Prosecuting Money laundering ..................................... 54 
3.8 General Observations on the Effectiveness of ML Responses in Rwanda ...................... 57 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS. ............................................... 60 
4.1 General Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 60 
4.2 General Recommendations ............................................................................................ 61 
4.2.1 Confronting the Enforcement Deficit ................................................................... 62 
4.2.2 Restructuring the Leadership and Functioning of FIU .......................................... 64 
4.2.3 Refining Public Awareness and Cooperation in AMLMatters............................... 65 
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
KEY WORDS 
 
Money Laundering 
Compliance 
Cooperation 
Due diligence 
Rwanda 
Criminalisation 
FIU 
Prosecution 
Enforcement deficit 
FATF 40 Recommendations
 
 
 
 
1 
 
  CHAPTER ONE 
 
      GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT RWANDA AND THE EXTENT OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
  
1.1 Introduction 
 
Throughout the world crime is an important social and economic issue.1 For criminals, it is a 
source of their livelihood. Criminals prefer to ply their trade in emerging economies, which are 
mainly found in developing countries. Such young, burgeoning economies need foreign 
investment, regardless of the source of the foreign capital.   
However, the competition amongst developing democracies for investments from abroad has 
also resulted in turning them into platforms where the proceeds of economic crimes are 
laundered and then integrated lawfully in the country of origin. 
Countries undergoing political transition are favoured by money launderers because of their 
proneness to corruption, fragile institutions of governance, and manipulable economies.2 It is 
assumed that at least between two and five percent of the global GDP is laundered every year.3 
                                                          
1  See David L & McCrary J Crime, Punishment, and Myopia (2005), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11491.pdf (accessed on 16 June 2015). 
2 Santha V ‘Factors affecting money laundering: lesson for developing countries’(2007) 10 (3) Journal of 
Money Laundering Control  358. 
3 See KPMG Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey (2014) 6, available at 
https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/global-anti-money-laundering-
survey/Documents/global-anti-money-laundering-survey-v3.pdf (accessed on 17 June 2014). 
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This chapter focuses on the facts and dimensions of money laundering (ML) in Rwanda, this 
small country in the African Great Lakes region, and explains why Rwanda requires strict anti-
money laundering laws.  
1.2 The State of Money Laundering in Rwanda 
In Rwanda, money laundering constitutes one of the least investigated risk areas. The dearth of 
research and literature on this crime makes it hard to determine its extent in Rwanda. Every 
year persons are prosecuted and punished for corruption, mismanagement of public funds and 
embezzlement. What remains untouched are the proceeds emanating from these crimes.  
According the Rwandan law, money laundering (ML) is an offence constituted by one or several 
acts4 aimed at disguising or concealing wealth originating from crime. Rwanda has adopted an 
all crimes approach, which means that any crime committed may give rise to money 
laundering.5 
 
In the Rwandan context, not all money that is laundered is aimed at financing terrorism. Most 
of the money laundering cases involve people who want to make their dirty money appear 
lawful. In principle, launderers do not have to exceed a monetary threshold determined by the 
Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) to be liable for ML,6 for small amounts of money may be 
laundered and produce effects which may even be more harmful to the economy than the few 
                                                          
4  Article 2 of the Law N°47/2008 of 09/09/2008 on Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and 
Financing of Terrorism (herein AML Law). 
5  See Louis K ‘Identifying and Managing Low Money Laundering Risk: Perspectives on FATF Risk Based 
Guidance’ (2009) 16 338. 
6 Article 5 of the AML Law. 
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cases of rich people who launder large sums of money. However, what happens in practice is 
another story, as discussed in chapter 3 of this paper. 
 
The risk of money laundering is high in the area of investment where the government does 
what it is needed to attract foreign investors. Under this facilitation package, the registration 
process is simplified and expedited, and investors are given unrestricted rights to conduct 
profitable business without being subjected to any bureaucratic hindrances. Investors are 
further lured through tax exemptions and immigration incentives.7 The areas most at risk of 
attracting money launderers include the financial institutions, the real estate sector, the 
hospitality industry and non-profit organizations. 
 
Undeniably, such government initiatives are commendable for their positive results. For 
example, the facilitation of capital inflow through the various incentives has increased foreign 
private investment by 4.1 percent from 2010 to 2011.8 However, given the vulnerability of its 
financial and legal institutions, Rwanda stands the risk of being hit by financial criminals who 
consider it a safe haven for their illegally acquired money. For example, the ease of company 
incorporation is an attraction for those who want to use companies as money laundering 
vehicles.9 
                                                          
7 This assumption is based on the dictates of article 42 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda which 
states that: “Every foreigner legally residing in the Republic of Rwanda shall enjoy all rights save those 
reserved for nationals as determined under this Constitution and other laws”. 
8 See the foreign private investments in Rwanda 2011, available at 
http://www.rdb.rw/uploads/tx_sbdownloader/FOREIGN_PRIVATE_INVESTMENT_IN_RWANDA_2011.pdf 
(accessed on 23 February 2014). 
9 See Brett F The Art and Science of Money Laundering: Inside the Commerce of Narcotic Traffickers (1998) 
47. 
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More risky is the widespread use of internet and mobile banking, which have been privatised 
and is run by local agents. The people running these businesses are profit-motivated lay people 
with little regard for laws requiring them to conduct due diligence when engaging in financial 
transactions.10 
Of concern is the fact that Rwanda’s urge to liberalise and expand its financial sector exceeds its 
capacity to ensure proper oversight of businesses. This poses a great risk in that criminals 
around the world perceive it as an opportunity to launder their money. This risk is associated 
with other unresolved legal and policy issues regarding the criminalisation and prosecution of 
money laundering cases. 
In addition, Rwanda does not have a detailed anti-money laundering (AML) implementation 
strategy.  The directives issued to combat ML come not from the government, but from the 
Financial Investigation Unit (FIU), which has been put in charge of fighting money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism.  
Rwanda is also not yet a member of any Financial Action Task Force-styled regional body 
(FSRB).11 Currently, it enjoys mere observer status in the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-
Money Laundering Group. For this reason, it has never undergone a mutual evaluation on the 
implementation of the international AML standards. This paper is a snapshot of a current state 
of affairs relating to AML in Rwanda. 
                                                          
10 Mobile money services are provided by private individuals, overridden by the urge to benefit, whose 
ability to assess to risks of money laundering is reduced. 
11 See the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, available at 
http://www.knowyourcountry.com/rwanda1111.html (accessed on 24 February 2014). 
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Given the loopholes sketched above, it is essential to establish whether Rwanda’s AML law and 
regulations are effective at all, especially when compared to the international AML 
benchmarks. 
1.3 Country Facts 
 
Rwanda is a developing country populated by 11 million people, 90% of whom are engaged in 
agriculture.12 The 1994 genocide has shaken its economy, impoverished its population and has 
affected the country's ability to attract private and foreign investment. The government has 
aimed to uplift the social and economic wellbeing of Rwandans by introducing reforms such as 
decentralisation, the creation of competent public institutions and strengthening the private 
sector. However, the country lacks enough people with technical skills. The private sector is also 
hamstrung by relatively high energy and transport costs. 
Rwanda has a raft of regulations and reforms to improve the general business and investment 
climate, which has improved the country’s competitiveness internationally.13 Rwanda’s 
economy relies mainly on the services sector, which accounted for 48% of the National GDP in 
2012.14 Other sources of revenue are agriculture, tourism, mineral exports, communications, as 
well as transport. Rwanda has also liberalized its international trade policy by promoting the 
free movement of people and capital throughout the East African Community (EAC).15 
                                                          
12  See the World Fact Book, available on https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/rw.html (accessed on 16 June 2014). 
13 See the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2012/13, available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf (accessed on 19 
February 2013). 
14  See the GDP Fiscal year estimates 2012-2013, available at http://statistics.gov.rw/gdp-national-accout-
fiscal-year-201213  (accessed on 26 March 2014). 
15 See the regulation 5 of the EAC Common Market Protocol on the Free Movement of the People, available 
at http://www.eac.int/commonmarket/movement-of-persons.html (accessed on 16 June 2014). 
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More progress is discernible in the information and telecommunication (ICT) sector. The 
internet has contributed to improvements in sectors such as   governance, service delivery, 
communications and banking. Automated teller machines (ATM) and electronic payment 
facilities have enhanced the conducting of online financial transactions. However, apart from a 
few provisions in the Penal code and a collection of different regulations on ICT, there are, for 
example, no specific laws or regulations to combat cyber money laundering.  
Rwanda’s economy relies heavily on donor funds. As much as 48 percent of its annual budget 
consists of foreign aid. Foreign commitment to support Rwanda is based on its reputation as an 
effective user of foreign aid.16 However, this strong partnership with foreign countries 
deteriorated in 2012 as a result of allegations that Rwanda was supporting the Mouvement 
Mars 23 (M23) militias,17 the then rebel group which was fighting against the government of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This led some countries to withdraw aid to Rwanda, 
an act which caused a shortfall of US$230 million (equivalent to 3 percent of its GDP) per year. 
More efforts to restore economic stability were undertaken, and at the time of writing, the 
country is regaining its economic stability.  
Against this background, it is clear that the economy of Rwanda is still in its infancy. It needs 
huge investments and partnerships for it to be self-sustainable. However, the legal framework 
to suppress the risks of ML and FT is feeble. 
                                                          
16  Effective use of aid by Rwanda was announced in the 2012 Busan Fourth High level forum on aid 
effectiveness.  The press release is available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/Busan%20partnership.pdf. (accessed on 24 February 2014). 
17 See the UN Group of Expert report on Rwanda’s support to M23 militias, available at 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_843.pdf  (accessed on 26 February2014). 
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1.4 An Overview of the Rwandan Legal System 
 
The courts in Rwanda are classified into two categories: the ordinary courts consisting of five 
organs, namely, the Supreme Court, High Courts, Intermediate Courts, Primary Courts, and the 
specialised courts, which include Military Courts and Commercial Courts. The Judiciary is 
headed by a Chief Justice who is assisted by a Deputy Chief Justice. 
Rwanda has a mixed legal system, which means its law has both Civil and Common Law 
features. The Constitution is the highest law of the land, followed, in order of supremacy, by 
international instruments binding the country, organic Laws, ordinary laws and promulgated 
decrees. This ranking takes precedence in cases where legal provisions contradict each other. 
1.5       Rwanda in the Great Lakes 
1.5.1 Regional Security 
 
The importance of regional security to Rwanda derives from the suspicion that Rwanda’s 
current, relative economic wellbeing stems from its exploitation of the neighbouring DRC’s 
mineral resources. These proceeds coming from regional conflicts, which are frowned upon 
internationally, are laundered through development projects in other neighbouring countries.18  
In fact, its involvement in DRC conflict dates back to 1995, when Rwanda contributed to the 
overthrow of the then President Mobutu Sese Seko, based on the fact that the latter was 
                                                          
18   See Watson Institute for International Studies Colonialism in the Congo: Conquest, Conflict, and 
Commerce (2005), available at http://projects.ecfs.org/eastwest/Readings/CongoSim.pdf (accessed on 20 
October2014). 
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harbouring the Force Democratique pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR),19 a Rwandan rebel 
group operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo which, according to the Rwandan 
government, is composed of perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.20 
Rwanda is said to have aided many militia groups in the eastern part of the DRC in order 
annihilate its main guerrilla opponent, the FDLR. In the effort to end this war, various regional 
initiatives were launched, such as the deployment of the Foreign Intervention Brigade (FIB),21 
the main purpose of which was to neutralise all the rebel groups operating in the DRC.  
Towards the end of 2013, the FIB managed to overrun and disarm some of the main rebel 
groups which, according to many security analysts, has resulted in the removal the buffer zone 
that protected Rwanda from FDLR attacks, thus creating tension between Rwanda, on the one 
hand, and Tanzania and South Africa,22 on the other. Rwanda is accusing the other two of 
providing logistics, military bases, intelligence, and evacuation services for the FDLR.23 
 
 
                                                          
19  Carole C ‘Southern Africa: A new Congo in a new region’ (1998) Vol 13 No. 3 South African Report, 
available at http://www.africafiles.org/printableversion.asp?id=3797 (accessed on 16 July 2014). 
20  Richard M ‘FDLR: From architects of genocide to Congo rebels’ The Citizen 13 November 2013 3, available 
at http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/magazine/political-reforms/FDLR--From-architects-of-genocide-to-Congo-
rebels-/-/1843776/2071452/-/13xleh6/-/index.html (accessed on 17 July 2014). 
21   The Foreign Intervention Brigade is composed of troops from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania. 
22  Machira P ‘Tanzania-Rwanda relations may worsen – MPs’ IPP Media 31 May 2014, available at 
http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=68415 (accessed on 17 July 2014). See also Gabriel G ‘Rwanda 
activist murder 'linked to DRC' conflict’ BBC News Africa 27 March 2014, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26762930 (accessed on 17 July 2014). 
23  Shyaka K ‘Unholly Alliance: MONUSCO together with the Foreign Intervention Brigade (FIB) work with the 
FDLR and the Congolese army, FARDC’ Rwanda Focus 29 July 2013, available at 
http://focus.rw/wp/2013/07/unholy-alliance/ (accessed on 5 July 2014). 
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1.5.2 Who Benefits from the Minerals? 
 
The DRC has always accused Rwanda of exchanging military support for minerals mined by 
rebel groups.24 Rwanda, in reply, has always denied having any economic interest in the Eastern 
DRC, stating that it has a proper, professional mineral certification process.25 
Regardless of the veracity of Rwanda’s response to the DRC accusation, there is no denying the 
fact that the DRC government has lost control of its eastern territories in which armed rebel 
groups flourish and proliferate because of their unlawful exploitation of the mineral resources, 
something they do with impunity.26 Some of the rebel groups are not even involved in the 
conflict.27  
                                                          
24 Daniel R. ‘Mineral smuggling in Central Africa: The case of Rwanda, Uganda and perpetual violence in the 
DRC’ Consultancy Africa Intelligence 18 February 2013, available at 
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1222:mineral-
smuggling-in-central-africa-the-case-of-rwanda-uganda-and-perpetual-violence-in-the-drc-
&catid=57:africa-watch-discussion-papers&Itemid=263 (accessed on 22 July 2014). 
25 Editor ‘A lasting solution will come by addressing the real issues of governance’ The East African 15 
December 2012, available at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Address-governance-issues-for-
lasting-solution/-/2558/1644690/-/swxrrlz/-/index.html  (accessed on 22 July 2014).  
26   Channel Research, Joint Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (2010) 8, available at http://www.channelresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2010-04-Policy-
Report-light.pdf (accessed on 15 September 2014). 
27 Andrews  A and  Nyambura   G ‘Addressing the ‘conflict minerals’ crisis  
In the Great lakes Region’ (2012) Policy Brief No. 35 ISS 3, available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/No35GreatLakes.pdf (accessed on 5 July 2014). 
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1.6 The Overall Crime Situation in Rwanda 
Generally, Rwanda has a low to moderate incidence of crime,28 but this does not discount the 
fact that the occurrence of the following serious crimes worries the law enforcement 
authorities: 
a. Human Trafficking: Many people are trafficked either from or through Rwanda annually 
to Asian and European countries.29 Among the victims are girls under the age of 18 who 
are trafficked for purposes of labour and sexual exploitation.30  
 
b. Corruption: Rwanda is one of the least corrupt countries in the region and on the 
African continent as a whole.31 This progress against corruption has been made possible 
through a firm political will to fight corruption through the enactment of deterrent 
policies and laws.32 The government has acted against corruption, for it is regarded as a 
major barrier to the economic and social development of the nation.33 The government 
has introduced codes of conduct and has imposed accountability measures for politically 
                                                          
28 See the Rwanda 2013 Crime and Safety Report, available at 
https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=14038 (accessed on 16 September 2014). 
29 United States Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report –Rwanda (2013), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/51c2f39359.html (accessed on 18 March 2014).  
30 See the United States Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report –Rwanda (2013), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/51c2f39359.html (accessed on 18 March2014). 
31 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (2013), available at 
http://www.transparencia.org.es/BAROMETRO_GLOBAL/Bar%C3%B3metro_Global_2013/Global_Corrupt
ion_Barometer_2013.pdf   accessed on 24 February 2014) and the East African Bribery Index (EABI) 2012, 
available at http://tikenya.org/index.php/more-links/publications/corruption-surveys/east-africa-bribery-
index (accessed on 28 February 2014).  
32 See the Rwanda National Anti-Corruption Policy, available at 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.rw/Documents/pdf/POLICY%20final%20after%20cabinet.pdf (accessed on 
27 February 2014). 
33 Rwanda Governance Board Rwanda’s Anti-Graft Drive: Assessing global indexes’ Findings on Transparency 
and corruption (2013), available at: 
http://www.rgb.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Corruption_analysis.pdf (accessed on 24 February 2014). 
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exposed persons (PEPs). As a result, a significant number of PEPs and civil servants have 
been prosecuted and others were requested to resign from their positions, following 
allegations of corruption.34 
 
c. Cybercrimes: Cases of robbery of automatic teller machines (ATMs) and system hacking 
were recorded in 2013 due to the fragility of the e-banking system. The weaknesses so 
far identified include the lack of a specific anti-cybercrime law, uneven legal standards 
regulating information and community technology and a weak criminal justice system 
when it comes to prosecuting cybercrime, especially because of the difficulty of 
adducing evidence with regard to this brand of crime.35 
 
d. Terrorism: Grenade attacks have taken place since 2009 and have targeted busy 
markets and transit hubs in towns. These acts have been imputed to the Force 
Démocratique pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a Rwandan rebel group operating in 
the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.36 
 
e. Embezzlement of Public Funds: In the last seven years, 765 senior government officials 
have been fired and have faced prosecution for alleged acts of embezzlement, and 
                                                          
34 Boris B ‘Rwanda gets tough on corruption’ The Telegraph 07 December 2009 6, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6752425/Rwanda-gets-tough-on-corruption.html 
(accessed on 27 March 2014). 
35 Patrick M and Maureen O Workshop Report on Effective Cybercrime Legislation in Eastern Africa (2013), 
available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/Source/Cybercrime/Octopus2013/2571_EastAfri
ca_WS_Report.pdf  (accessed on 16 June 2014). 
36 See the US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 (2013), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209979.html (accessed on 16 June 2014). 
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abuse of power.37  The Office of the Prosecutor is yet to sue 281 more squanderers of 
public resources over different embezzlement cases involving 833 million Rwandan 
francs (Rwf).38 
f. Mismanagement of Public Funds:  Mismanagement of public funds has taken place 
mostly in the public works and energy sectors. The Parliamentary Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) has summoned the supervising public authorities repeatedly to 
explain the reasons behind the poor management. The root cause remains the lack of 
concrete governmental strategies and measures to fight graft and to arrest, try and 
punish the culprits. 
1.7      Why Rwanda Needs Strong Anti-Money Laundering Laws 
 
1.7.1 Operational Reasons 
 
Given Rwanda’s fragile economy and its dependence on foreign aid, it needs strong AML/CFT 
laws and regulations to enhance the integrity of its financial sector in order to be regarded 
internationally as a reliable and predictable country with which to do business.39 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37   Twizeyimana F ‘765 senior officials convicted over embezzlement in the last 7 years’ Igihe Newspaper 25 
October 2014, available at http://www.igihe.com/amakuru/u-rwanda/article/abayobozi-765-bahamijwe-
kurigisa (accessed on 27 October 2014). 
38   Musoni E ‘Gov’t to drag nearly 300 to Court over Embezzlement’ The New Times 16 September 2014  6. 
39 International Monetary Fund Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism: a multi-donor Trust Fund 
(2009) 2, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/otm/2009/anti-money.pdf (accessed on 16 June 
2014). 
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1.7.2 Reputational Reasons 
A clean record and financial reputation are requisite ingredients for a country to grow and 
prosper. A country that does not have  impeccable and honest financial institutions, equipped 
with anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing measures, is likely to fall prey to these 
crimes, thus making it a risky destination for foreign investments.40 In other words, whenever a 
country is suspected of acting contrary to international standards, its reputation is affected 
adversely, causing an overall decline in trust and openness. For instance, refusal to comply may 
lead to loss of profitable business as well as financial problems through withdrawal of funds and 
termination of development partnerships. Since Rwanda depends hugely on foreign aid and 
investments, it is in its best interests to have strong AML mechanisms in place and to be serious 
about implementing them. 
1.7.3 Regional Integration Reasons 
Among the benefits attached to being a member of the East African Community (EAC)41 is the 
right of citizens of this community of states to move and to settle freely in each of the member 
states.42 Therefore, strong AML laws are required to strengthen the state’s capacity to respond 
to any ML risk that may be associated with the free movement of people and capital. When 
ordinary people cross borders, so, too, do criminals who explore opportunities to commit 
crimes. 
                                                          
40  International Federation of Accountants Anti-Money Laundering 2nd Ed (2004) 13, available at 
https://www.ifac.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/anti-money-laundering-2n.pdf (accessed on 13 
October 2014). 
41 The Member states of the East African Community are Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda Kenya and Tanzania. 
42 Article 1-6 of the East African Community Free Movement of Person Regulations, adopted in Moshi on 20 
June 2009. 
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It is worth mentioning that the domestic laws of the EAC member states have not yet been 
harmonised. Apart from the cooperation framework signed amongst them, very little has been 
done so far by member states to enact congruent laws to curb cross-border criminality. 
1.7.4 Regional Security Reasons 
The African great lakes region has been characterised by conflicts of all sorts. The most affected 
is the Democratic Republic of Congo whose natural resources are not only the cause of the 
ongoing war, but also an impediment to its ending.43 It is believed that a group of profiteering 
states would never wish to see the end of this war. Rwanda should therefore have strong AML 
laws to curb the cross-border movement of minerals, the proceeds from the sales of which may 
be used to fuel interstate conflict.  
1.8 Structure of the Study 
 
The remainder of this research paper is organised as follows: Chapter two deals with the 
definition of ML and the international legal instruments to combat it. Chapter three focuses on 
Rwanda’s attempts to fight ML and the impediments encountered in doing so. Chapter Four 
concludes the paper with a set of recommendations. 
 
                                                          
43 Montague D and Berriga F ‘The Business of War in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Who 
Benefits?’(2001) World Policy Institute 3, available at 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/news/dollarsandsense.html (accessed on 5 May 2014). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
UNDERSTANDING MONEY LAUNDERING: CONCEPT AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Money laundering is a transnational concern that necessitates joint measures for its prevention 
detection and its eradication.44 Different initiatives aimed at combating money Laundering have 
been launched at both regional and international level. These include model legal frameworks 
and the adoption of AML standards. 
 
Model laws have been drafted by international specialised agencies and were proposed to 
states for their consideration. The aim of these propositions is to implement at the domestic 
level effective, uniform,  preventative and retaliatory measures in respect of combating ML.45 In 
addition to the existing international legal instruments, international organisations such as the 
United Nations (UN), the Group of Seven (the G7), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank (WB) have prevailed on countries to enact measures that give effect to the 
Financial Action Task Force’s anti-money laundering recommendations, the implementation of 
which at national level is measured through regular peer reviews.46 
 
                                                          
44 Brett F The Art and Science of Money Laundering: Inside the commerce of narcotic traffickers (1998) 177.  
45 Alexander K ‘The international anti-money laundering regime: the role of The Financial Action Task Force’ 
(2001) 4 3 Journal of Money Laundering Control 217. 
46 Santha V ‘Factors affecting money laundering: lesson for developing countries’ (2007) 10 3 Journal of 
Money Laundering Control 361. 
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Despite Rwanda’s partial enactment of the international AML standards and the criminalisation 
of ML, its AML measures are not comprehensive enough to eliminate fully the risks of ML as 
compared to other compliant states.  
 
This Chapter looks into how money laundering is conceived under Rwandan law. 
2.2 Understanding Money Laundering  
Money Laundering is the process of cleansing the money originating from crime and making it 
appear lawful.47 It enables the transformation of illegally obtained money into legitimate funds. 
In other words, ML aims to make dirty money look lawful48  so that it can be used without fear 
of its being linked to its criminal source, which would render it confiscatable by the law 
enforcement authorities.49 
Rwanda, like many other countries, has opted to define ML in a way consistent with the 1988 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 
Rwanda undertook an ostensive definition of ML where the following are described as acts of 
ML: the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing that, at the time of receipt, such 
property was derived from an offence.50 
 
                                                          
47 United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters on Combating Money 
Laundering: Opportunities Exist to Improve the National Strategy (2003) 7, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/239956.pdf (accessed on 10 June 2014). 
48 Reuter P and Edwin T Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight against Money Laundering (2004) 1.  
49 Naylor R T ‘Predators, Parasites or Free Market Pioneers: Reflections on the Nature and Analysis of Profit 
Driven Crime’ in Margaret  B (ed) Critical Reflections on Transnational Organised Crime, Money 
Laundering  and Corruption (2005) 36.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
50 Article 3(c) of the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
adopted on 20 December 1988. 
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Its definition is also broadened to cover the conversion, the transfer and the concealment of 
property originating from crime, to ensure that any gain or use of gains linked to crime is 
criminalised.  This would obviate the potential risk of proceeds of crime being used to finance 
other crimes, such as terrorism, for example.51  
Technically, money laundering consists of three phases, namely: placement, layering and 
integration.52 
a. Placement or placing53 is the depositing of dirty funds in financial institutions or the 
conversion of cash into negotiable, redeemable or saleable instruments. Being a first 
step towards legalisation, this step is the most difficult of all because financial 
institutions must verify the origin of the money and have a duty to report to the 
competent authority when the amount of money deposited gives rise to suspicion.54 
However, launderers opt to channel their cash into an operating business or to convert 
it into negotiable instruments, such as cashier's cheques, money orders, or traveller’s 
cheques through a third person.55 
b. Layering consists in transferring the ill-gotten money through a series of accounts in an 
attempt to hide the funds' true origins.56 This could involve transferring the money 
through banks in different countries before it is integrated into the normal economy. 
                                                          
51 European Union Committee of the House of Lords Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
Report 2009  (2010) 3. 
52 Reuter P and Edwin T ‘Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight against Money Laundering’ (2004) 25. 
53 Georgeta M ‘Judicial Aspects on Money Laundering‘ (2007) Agora international Journal for Juridical 
Science Vol 2 154,  available at www.juridicaljournal.univagora.ro/download/pdf/61.pdf (accessed on 1 
June 2014). 
54 Hinterseer K Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal Context 
(2002) 15. 
55 Jonathan T Money Laundering Prevention: Deterring, Detecting, and Resolving Financial Fraud (2011) 8.  
56 Jonathan T (2011) 9. 
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This phase may involve the buying of goods which are then resold on the open market. 
The idea here is to separate the funds as far as possible from the crime, thus making it 
difficult to trace the money back to its source.57 
c. Integration refers to the stage at which the layered money is legitimately integrated 
into the lawful financial system to make it appear as having a legal provenance. At this 
stage it is difficult to say whether the money is clean or dirty. 
 
Given the new developments in technology, criminals do not always need to follow this three-
step process to launder the proceeds of crime.58  They might even combine the first two phases 
depending on how vigilant the banks are.  An example of where placement and layering take 
place at the same time is where the criminal receives payments for business deals that never 
took place. Another example of combining layering and integration is the under-the-table cash 
transaction which enables launderers to simulate a transaction that, in fact, does not take 
place.59 
2.3 International Instruments Meant to Fight Money Laundering 
 
There is no dedicated anti-money laundering convention. However, the notion is embedded in 
a number of international instruments aimed at combating money laundering and the financing 
of terrorism. They are the following:  
 
                                                          
57 Hasmet S ‘Money Laundering and Abuse of the Financial System’ (2013) International Journal of Business 
and Management Studies 293. 
58 Stessens G Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model (2003) 68; Reuter P and 
Edwin T (2004) 25. 
59 Donato M, Elod T and Brigitte U Black Finance: the Economy of Money Laundering (2007) 104. 
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2.3.1 The United Nations Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988) 
 
This convention criminalises the illegal trade in narcotics, but does so in a way that mirrors the 
essential steps of the money laundering process. In its preamble, it calls on States Parties to 
eliminate criminal incentives by depriving persons engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of 
their criminal activities. 
 
Over time, its ambit has been extended to cover other crimes which trigger money laundering, 
the so-called predicate offences. Rwanda ratified it in 2002.  
 
2.3.2 The United Nation Convention against Corruption (2003) 
 
This convention, which Rwanda ratified in 2006, considers the crime of ML as part of corruption 
offences due to their close connection.60 In addition, its Article 14 mentions specifically the 
measures that States Parties to the Convention should adopt to combat money laundering, 
including:  
- instituting a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for financial 
institutions;61 
- implementing measures for cross border monitoring of cash and other negotiable 
instruments;62 
- managing electronic fund transfers, including  remittances; and 
                                                          
60  Article 23 of UNCAC. 
61 Article 14(1)(a) of UNCAC. 
62 Article 14(1)(b) of UNCAC. 
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- applying various supranational anti-money laundering guidelines to combat money 
laundering.63 
 
2.3.3 The United Nation Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
 
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crimes (the Palermo 
Convention) which Rwanda ratified in 2003 also provides for the need to establish anti-money 
laundering measures. Its Article 7 provides for measures needed to: 
- deter and detect all forms of money laundering through the strengthening  of domestic  
legal regimes; 
- ensure the capacity and the readiness of the  law enforcement  authorities dedicated to 
combating money-laundering; and  
- cooperate against money laundering at the regional and international level. 
Both UNCAC and the Palermo Convention have broadened the scope of the AML regime to 
cover all the proceeds of other serious crimes.64 Whereas both Conventions urge states to 
enact laws applicable to banks and other financial institutions, they also call for the 
establishment of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). 
2.3.4 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2002) 
This convention requires states to take measures to protect their financial systems from being 
misused by persons planning or engaged in terrorist activities. Rwanda ratified it in 2002. 
                                                          
63 Article 14(1)(c) of UNCAC. 
64 Initially, only proceeds of illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances were criminalized 
into the context of money laundering. 
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In its preamble, this Convention exhorts states to adopt measures to prevent and counteract 
movements of funds suspected of being intended for terrorist purposes without impeding in 
any way the freedom of legitimate capital movements and to intensify the exchange of 
information concerning international movements of such funds. 
Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the UN member 
states agreed that there was a link between terrorism, transnational organised crime, the 
international drug trade and money-laundering.65 States were therefore urged to ratify the 
international conventions regulating these crimes and to implement their provisions.66  
These practical steps include a wide array of measures relating to strengthening state capacity 
to counter ML and a better coordination of states’ efforts regionally and internationally.  
2.3.5 Financial Action Task Force Standards (The FATF 40 Recommendations ) 
 
The FATF was created in April 1989 during a G7 Summit in Paris, and was mandated to design 
policies and procedures at both state and international level to curtail the increasing incidence 
of money laundering.67 In 1990, the FATF issued a set of 40 Recommendations to improve the 
AML regime at national level and to enhance regional and international cooperation in the fight 
against money laundering.  
                                                          
65 Schott P ‘Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: 
Supplement on special Recommendation IX’ (2006) 2 ed11. See also Sollier J (2007} 39.   
66 See SC/RES/1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, available at 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/392A001F254B4B9085256B4B00708233 (accessed on 15 June 
2014). 
67 Laurel S ‘An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and its 2008 Lawyer Guidance’ (2010) Journal 
of the Professional Lawyer 6. 
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These recommendations were subsequently improved in 1996, 2001, 2003 and 2012, with new 
additions to the requirements relating to the conducting of customer due diligence, the seizing 
and freezing of the proceeds of crime, and establishing identities of the beneficial owners of 
companies and trusts.68 
In October 2001, the FATF’s mandate was extended to the financing of terrorism. This resulted 
in the FATF issuing a further nine so-called Special Recommendations to give effect to the UN 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
Likewise, more was done by the UN in response to the threat posed by international terrorism. 
For instance, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1617 of 2005 and the 
United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted through the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) in 2006, have played a significant role in alerting states to the importance of 
implementing the FATF recommendations. 
2.4 The Rwandan Anti-Money Laundering Legal Regime 
 
The concept of money laundering is relatively new in Rwanda. No case relating to money 
laundering has yet been prosecuted or even investigated by any one of the competent 
authorities. However, Rwanda has adopted a few proactive measures against money 
laundering.  
 
                                                          
68 Johnson J and Desmond L ‘Money laundering: has the Financial Action Task Force made a 
difference?’(2002) 10 Journal of Financial Crimes 7. 
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In this study, the Rwandan AML legal regime is divided into two categories. In the first category 
are the core AML enactments, namely the Penal Code, the AML Law and the Presidential Order 
establishing the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). In the second category are other laws which 
impact indirectly on countering money laundering.  
 
2.4.1 The Core AML Laws 
2.4.1.1 Law No 47/2008 on the Prevention and Penalising the Crime of Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism 
 
This law provides for a descriptive definition of money laundering by clarifying particular acts 
which may constitute a crime of money laundering under Rwandan law. It further regulates the 
supervision of the Financial Institutions (FI) and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and 
Professions (DNFBPs) to enhance transparency and openness in their operations. It also 
contains provisions on international cooperation in the fight against money laundering. 
 
According to this law, the predicate offences committed outside Rwanda are punishable in 
Rwanda as well. 
2.4.1.2 The Organic Law No 01/2012/OL of 2 May 2012 establishing the Penal Code. 
 
Rwanda’s Penal Code was enacted in 2012. It stipulates various offences, including money 
laundering, and the penalties they carry. The Penal Code adopts the definition of money 
laundering as contained in the 1988 Vienna Convention, with some adaptions. It makes ML 
punishable by a term of between five and seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of two to five 
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times the value of the amount of the laundered.69 The Penal Code also provides for the 
permanent confiscation of proceed of crimes, not merely as a punishment, but also as a 
preventive measure.70 
 
2.4.1.3 Presidential Order No 119/01 of 9 December 2011 on the Financial Investigation 
Unit  
 
This order establishes the form, function and purpose of the FIU, the biggest role player in the 
implementation of Rwanda’s anti-money laundering regime. 
2.4.2 Other Laws with an Indirect Contribution to the Fight against Money Laundering 
In addition to the above-mentioned core AML laws, other laws contributing indirectly to the 
fight against ML in Rwanda are: 
1. Law No 04/2013 of 8 February 2013 relating to access to information; 
2. Law No 86/2013 of 11 September 2013 establishing the general statutes for public 
service; 
3. Law No 35/2012 of 19 September 2012 relating to the protection of whistleblowers; 
4.  Law No 18/2010 of 12 May 2010 relating to electronic messages, electronic signatures 
and electronic transactions; 
5. Law No 23/2003 of 07 August 2003 related to the prevention and the punishment of 
corruption and related offences; and 
6. Law No 60/2013 of 22 August 2013 regulating the interception of communications. 
                                                          
69 Article 654 of the Penal Code of Rwanda. 
70 Article 651 of the Penal Code of Rwanda. 
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Although the above-mentioned laws regulate different subject matter, they are an important 
addition to the Rwandan AML regime because of their importance to the investigation and 
prosecution of money laundering. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Rwanda has demonstrated its commitment to stamping out money laundering by enacting a 
number of laws. However, there is room for improvement, especially in so far as it concerns the 
need to harmonize the laws and to strive for more coherent regional approaches to the 
problem. However, some procedural issues regarding the extra-territorial application of 
Rwandan AML law and the extent to which Rwanda can proceed with their prosecution remain 
a controversial issue amongst lawyers. 
The next chapter assesses the effectiveness of the above-mentioned laws in practice.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ML RESPONSES IN RWANDA 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Montesquieu’s famous 1748 treatise on political theory has laid a legal basis for laws being 
considered as pillars for policy implementation at all levels of government.71 Institutions are 
therefore considered as vehicles by means of which policy ideals are put into effect.72  As for 
the fight against money laundering, laws and institutions play a critical part, for without 
institutions which apply them, the laws would be useless.73 
 
This chapter examines the effectiveness of the legal and institutional responses adopted by 
Rwanda in the fight against money laundering. Furthermore, it measures these laws and 
practices against the FATF recommendations of 2012. 
3.2       The Legal Responses 
3.2.1 Scope of Criminalisation 
 
Rwanda has a bifurcated approach when it comes to combating money laundering. The one is 
an all-crimes approach, meaning that all crimes are predicate crimes for money laundering; the 
other is a list approach, by which is meant that only the listed crimes are understood to trigger 
                                                          
71 Montesquieu C The Spirit of Laws: Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (1989) 8. 
72 Kent W and Bert R (eds.) Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad 
(1993) 17. 
73 Linda C The Ombudsman, Good Governance, and the International Human Rights System (2004) 85. 
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the money laundering cycle. The Penal Code adopts the all-crimes approach whereas the list 
approach is provided for in other enactments.  
 
Thus, the existence of a dual approach in Rwanda to criminalise money laundering has made 
the prosecution of this crime difficult in practice, as lawyers and law enforcers are at 
loggerheads when it comes to the prosecution of the crime of money laundering.74 
 
The supporters of the all-crimes approach base their arguments on the constitutional hierarchy 
of norms, according to which the Penal Code is considered to supersede contradictory clauses 
in other laws, including the Anti-Money Laundering Law.75 The advocates of the list approach 
challenge the above argument, stating that Article 5 of the AML Law, which lists the predicate 
offences for money laundering, is not mentioned anywhere in the Penal Code as being 
reviewed or repealed, submitting that this omission may be construed to mean that the article 
still stands and that its criminalising scope remains valid and applicable. 
 
Each of the approaches has its strengths and weaknesses. The list approach is commended by 
experts in criminal law for being both specific and strategic,76 but is criticised for its disregard of 
the serious offences such as the financing of terrorism, fraud, piracy, and counterfeiting of 
currency.77 While the all-crimes approach is praised for its capacity to curb ML in a broader 
sense than the list approach, it is criticised for overreaching its purview and diverging from the 
overall effort to fight ML. 
                                                          
74 Hitimana J ‘Rwanda to be assessed on its compliance with global standards of Anti-Money Laundering 
and combating the financing of terrorism’ (2012) 23 Le Banquier de la BNR 12. 
75 Article 93 of the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda as amended to date. 
76 Humphrey M ‘Fighting money laundering: The challenges in Africa’ (2007) ISS 2, available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper152.pdf (accessed on 8 October 2014).  
77 Article 5 of the AML Law. 
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In brief, the discrepancy in content, and the resultant dilemma as to which approach to adopt, 
are traceable to the mistakes made when the Penal Code was drafted.  As a result, the 
implementers of the law are now at a loss as to how to combine the two approaches in 
practice. This quandary presents criminals with a golden opportunity to escape the clutches of 
the law and to go unpunished. 
3.2.2 Elements of the Crime of Money Laundering in Rwanda 
 
Under Rwandan law, an individual may be liable for money laundering upon the commission of 
the following acts: 
a. Direct commission: This means the conversion, transfer or handling of property derived 
from  crime, the concealment or disguise of the true nature, origin, location, disposition, 
donation and rights with respect to or ownership of property; 
b. Indirect commission: Here the material element of the crime is constituted in the  
acquisition, possession or use of property derived from crimes; and 
c. Other supplementary forms of liability: This refers to association with a group, meaning 
attempting, aiding or abetting, inciting, facilitating, counseling and disregard for cross 
border cash declaration procedures.78 
The only mental element required to establish individual guilt, and thus to ground a conviction 
on a charge of money laundering, is the accused’s knowledge of the unlawfulness of the 
conduct. This form of mens rea is construed strictly by the court and other forms of intent, such 
                                                          
78 Non respect of cross border declarations of cash was included in other supplementary forms of ML 
liability as incrimination by implication. It is implied that a person who crosses the border without 
declaring cash exceeding the declarable threshold, commits a crime of ML. 
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as suspicion or reasonable foreseeability, are not considered. In other words, only actual 
knowledge suffices to establish the mental element of the crime of money laundering.  
 
This limitation of culpability to the perpetrator’s active knowledge contravenes the provisions 
contained in international instruments such as UNCAC, the Palermo Convention and the Vienna 
Convention, all of which provide that other objective factual circumstances may reflect the 
knowledge, intent and purpose of the perpetrator. 
3.2.3 Extra-Territorial Application of the AML Laws 
 
Establishing the capacity of Rwandan laws to be applied to cases beyond its borders is very 
important for understanding Rwanda’s ability to participate in the international fight against 
crime, its capacity to supervise the conduct of its nationals in foreign states, and its capacity to 
manage money laundering crimes perpetrated by foreign companies registered in Rwanda. 
The Rwandan Penal Code has listed crimes over which Rwanda can exercise universal 
jurisdiction.79 Money laundering is one of them, and is prosecutable in Rwanda even if the 
predicate offence, or the original act from which the proceeds to be laundered is derived, is 
committed on the territory of a foreign state. 80 However, new trends in transnational crime, 
which are a feature of today’s global economy, have rendered this law ineffective.  
 
                                                          
79 According to article 16 of the Penal Code,  Rwanda has jurisdiction over the following crimes  regardless of 
who commits them and where they were committed: terrorism; hostage-taking; piracy; drug trafficking; 
illicit manufacturing and trafficking in arms; money laundering; cross-border theft of vehicles with the 
intent of selling them abroad; information and communication technology related offences; trafficking in 
human beings especially children; slavery; torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes; genocide denial or revisionism  and   any form of participation in 
these  crimes. 
80 Article 652 Par 1 of the Penal Code of Rwanda. 
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Take, for example, acts committed outside Rwanda which do not constitute an offence in the 
foreign country, but which would be a predicate offence if committed in Rwanda. The law is not 
clear as to whether these acts may give rise to money laundering. This lack of clarity on the 
extraterritorial application of Rwandan law has affected many individuals, including nationals 
who do not know the fate of their wealth acquired from countries with weak or non-existent 
AML regulations. 
Another scenario would be that of predicate offences for money laundering which commence 
in Rwanda and are completed in foreign countries. This transnational execution of the crime 
becomes problematic because of the lack of specific skills in Rwanda not only to detect such 
crimes but also because the country lacks the people skilled enough to negotiate successful 
mutual legal assistance with the requested state. 
Also, there are acts constituting secondary participation in transnational money laundering 
crimes, where the principal act is not criminalised in the foreign state. This becomes a problem 
as Rwanda does not have firm strategies to establish liability for participation in economic 
crimes, including corruption and money laundering.  
The above scenarios are deserving of attention simply because of the likelihood of their 
occurring, especially given the fact that Rwanda is in the process of opening itself more and 
more to foreign investments.81  
                                                          
81 Rwanda National Bank Foreign Private Investment in Rwanda (2011) 4, available at 
http://www.bnr.rw/uploads/media/Foreign_private_Investment_in_Rwanda_2011_Booklet_.pdf  
(accessed on 7 September 2014). 
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The cause for worry here is that the blind extraterritorial application of Rwandan law may lead 
to abuse, all the more so given the absence of guidelines which prosecutors could apply when 
dealing with predicate offences committed abroad. Applying an all-crimes approach to such a 
scenario would be unfair and may lead to unintended consequences, such as denying 
Rwandans who live abroad the incentive to return to their home country for fear that their 
property may be confiscated as the proceeds of crimes. 
3.2.4 Dealing with Criminal Proceeds 
 
Rwandan law provides on ways to deal with property originating from crime or being used to 
commit a crime. These measures are used as means to intercept, delay or mitigate the 
consequence of criminal activities. In Rwanda, the law has provided different ways in which the 
state can deal with the property suspected to originate from crime. These include confiscation, 
freezing and seizure. 
 
3.2.4.1  Confiscation 
 
Under Rwandan law, confiscation and forfeiture may be used interchangeably. In the Penal 
Code, confiscation targets objects used in the commission of a crime and its proceeds. It may be 
applied as an additional measure to the main penalty so that other objects belonging to the 
convicted person are withheld or forfeited.82 
 
                                                          
82 Article 51 of the Penal Code of Rwanda. 
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The AML Law defines confiscation as a permanent deprivation of property by a definitive 
decision of a competent tribunal, which transfers to the state the ownership of this property 
and any related title to such property.83 It concerns: 
 
a. the objects of the offence, including revenues and other benefits which derived from 
it, regardless of who the owner might be, unless it is proved that the property was 
acquired in  good faith; 
b. The property belonging directly or indirectly to a person convicted of money 
laundering or to his/her spouse and his/her children, unless they are able to prove 
that their property has a lawful provenance. 84 
The proceeds of a crime may be confiscated as long as they are proven to originate from a 
crime. The confiscation may be executed even when the perpetrator of the predicate offence 
cannot be charged before the law, either because he/she is not known, or because it is legally 
impossible to prosecute him/her.85 Moreover, the Penal Code provides for the possibility to 
confiscate funds and property of equivalent value when the assets to be confiscated cannot be 
located or produced.86 
 
3.2.4.2  Freezing 
 
Under Rwandan law “freezing” is defined as a measure consisting of a temporary delay in the 
execution of a transaction, the prohibition or restriction of the transfer, the conversion, 
                                                          
83 Article 2 Par 3 of the AML Law. 
84 Article 57 Par 1 of the AML Law. 
85 Article 58 of the AML Law. 
86 Article 51 Par 3 of the Penal Code of Rwanda. 
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transformation or movement of property on the basis of a decision or a directive issued by a 
competent authority.87 
Freezing takes place in cases related to the financing of terrorism. Due to the urgency and 
gravity of cases that necessitate freezing, an ex parte order is not required because the FIU is 
invested with powers to take relevant action in the interests of national security. These powers 
are exercisable within a 48-hour period, after which the matter must be referred to the 
National Public Prosecution Agency (NPPA).  
Where the FIU does freeze the assets, it must inform the relevant financial institution involved 
in transferring the funds about the circumstances leading to the freezing of the funds. The 
NPPA may, subject to obtaining a court order, extend the freezing period to seven days in order 
to conduct further investigations.88 
3.2.4.3  Seizure 
 
According to the Rwandan code of criminal procedure, seizure may effected by law 
enforcement authorities in order to use the seized objects as incriminating or exculpating 
evidence.89 Seizure can be applied as a penalty in addition to the main sentence when the 
seized property is directly connected to the crime.90 
 
                                                          
87 Article 25 of the AML Law. 
88 Article 25 Par 3 of the AML Law. 
89 Article 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Rwanda. 
90 Article 386 and 257 of the Penal Code of Rwanda. 
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If the proceeds of the crime cannot be raised from the properties of the suspects, the NPPA or 
the competent court may seize other assets which the suspects possess, which are equivalent 
in value to the alleged proceeds of the offences.91 
3.2.5 Identification and Protection of Property Subject to Provisional Measures 
 
The FIU is empowered with investigative powers which it uses during the identification of 
property subject to provisional measures. It exercises these powers by virtue of its being a 
department of the Rwandan National Police. However, these powers are not used optimally in 
money laundering cases.  
Once assets are identified, the Law Enforcement Authority proceeds with their seizure, 
confiscation or freezing.  Confiscated property becomes State property and any financial 
transaction carried out thereafter with respect to such property is null and void.92 
3.2.6 The Fate of the Confiscated Property and the Protection of Third Party Interests 
 
The State may use the proceeds from confiscated property to fund crime prevention projects.93 
However, the State must not disregard interests of bona fide third parties in respect of the 
confiscated property. In case the prosecuted person is acquitted after judicial review, the state 
must make restitution for the confiscated assets in cash.94  
                                                          
91 Article 56 of the AML Law. 
92 Article 60 of the AML Law. 
93  Article 61 Par 1 of the AML Law. 
94 Article 61 Par 2 of the AML Law. 
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Bona fide third party interests are also protected in cases of null and void transactions relating 
to the confiscated property, but only if the owner can prove that the property was acquired in 
good faith.95 
3.2.7 Cross Border Movement of Cash 
 
Rwanda is surrounded by four countries, namely, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and has 17 official entry points, some of which are not 
operational.96 Whoever passes through any of the functioning entry points must declare 
whatever cash he or she has on him which exceeds the declarable threshold. But this does not 
apply to people in possession of withdrawal slips issued by banks. Whoever fails to make such a 
declaration is considered to have committed the offence of money laundering.97 
 
Even though everyone has a legal obligation to declare cash at the border post, other official 
practices undermine this requirement. For instance, Rwanda has entered into an agreement 
with Uganda and Kenya, in terms of which their citizens may move freely in the territory of each 
signatory country with the use a national identity card.  
This measure has relaxed the level of control over citizens moving across the borders of these 
three countries. This concession has made it easy for people crossing the borders with sums of 
                                                          
95 Article 57 Par 2 of the AML Law. 
96 See the list of Rwandan official border posts at http://www.migration.gov.rw/index.php?id=214 (accessed 
on 27 August 2014).   
97 Article 7 of the AML Law. 
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money above the declarable threshold to escape controls,98  a golden opportunity for money 
launderers.  
3.2.8 Aligning Rwanda’s Legal System to FATF Standards  
 
The Rwandan legal system complies partly with the FATF recommendations. Its extended scope 
of the criminalisation of money laundering is a reflection of FATF Recommendation 3, which 
requires  states  to criminalise all serious offences, with a view to widening the range of 
predicate offences for ML.  
 
Moreover, the FIU’s power to stay any suspicious transaction without a court order is a 
strategic stride for the FIU to do a better job. It is in accordance with FATF Recommendation 29, 
which requires states to give FIUs the enforcement information and powers required to 
undertake their functions properly.  
 
However, there are some drawbacks that need to be mentioned: 
 
First, the only recognised mental element under Rwandan law is knowledge in the strict sense. 
This is due to the fact that the dynamic interpretation of criminal laws is strictly prohibited, and 
courts are not allowed to base their judgments on analogy. Restricting the mental element to 
knowledge contravenes FATF Recommendation 3, which requires states to ensure that the 
                                                          
98 Kimenyi F ‘With cross-border trade prioritized, EAC integration process gets accelerated’ The New Times 
21 March 2014 3; Jean-Guy A and Gerald A Informal Cross Border Trade in Africa: Implications and Policy 
Recommendations (2012)  3 Africa Economic Brief 8. 
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intent and knowledge in money laundering cases may be inferred from objective factual 
circumstances.99 
Second, there is a risk that the FIU could abuse its powers to confiscate, seize or freeze 
suspicious assets to the detriment of third parties who have a good faith interest in the matter 
which, in turn, would undermine FATF Recommendation 6 which require that countries should 
adopt measures to enable their competent authorities to confiscate property laundered, 
without prejudicing the rights of bona fide third parties. 
Another deficiency relates to cross border cash declaration requirements. The rules on 
declarations of cash above the declarable limit have yet to be put into effect. Even though 
travellers are temporarily being requested to declare amounts of money exceeding 10 000 USD, 
there are no published directives on how to inform the public about their duty to declare this 
amount. 
What is more, the exemption provided for people with bank withdrawal slips undermines the 
purpose of the declaration. In other words, this exemption does not fully eliminate other risks 
such as the financing of terrorist groups operating outside the country. This exemption not only 
limits the effectiveness of the declaration system, but also impedes the ability of the FIU to 
exercise its powers to request and to obtain further information about the intended use of the 
money abroad. 
Moreover, the sanction for people who do not declare their wealth at the border is too 
stringent and not proportionate to the offence. In fact, the undeclared cash of those citizens 
                                                          
99 Article 4 of the Penal Code of Rwanda. 
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who cross the border may not necessarily be for a laundering purpose, for there might be 
other, not necessarily illegal reasons, such as ignorance of the law or pressing family exigencies 
which cause people to cross borders with forbidden sums of money. 
Additionally, most of the border posts are poorly staffed and lack the proper infrastructure to 
facilitate cash declarations, and where such infrastructure exists, it does not equate to the risk 
at stake. 
The above-mentioned weaknesses undercut Rwanda’s efforts to avert the threat posed to 
regional economies by transnational money laundering.  
3.3        Anti-Money Laundering Coordination and Institutional Framework 
3.3.1 The Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) 
 
The FIU was created to implement and coordinate national efforts to fight money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism.100 Its main duties are to collect, analyse and disseminate 
information related to potential money laundering or terrorist financing activities. It is also 
authorised to conduct investigations based on the information it acquires.101 
 
This unit is a law enforcement-type of FIU,102 entrusted with the powers to coordinate the 
implementation of the laws relating to the prevention and punishment of the crime of money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism. The FIU consists of police officers and a few civilians 
                                                          
100 Article 20 of the AML Law. 
101 Article 5 of the Presidential Order No 27/01 of 30 May 2011 Determining the Organization, Functioning 
and Mission of the Financial Investigation Unit (herein after FIU Presidential Order). 
102 International Monetary Fund Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview (2004) 13.  
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recruited on the basis of their exceptional knowledge in the area of money laundering.103 The 
FIU’s s head office is at the Rwandan National Police head office in Kigali.104 
The FIU, unfortunately, has the following shortcomings:  
First, the FIU’s operational independence is compromised by the fact that it operates under the 
National Police authority. Its director is appointed by the head of appointments in the Rwandan 
National Police.105 There are no clear guidelines for the nomination and dismissal of the director 
of the FIU. The fact that the FIU’s organisational structure is determined by the Rwandan 
National Police Council106 undermines its operational independence.  
 
Second, the fact that some of the FIU’s staff are not appointed on a permanent basis, coupled 
with the lack of a clearly defined policy to retain staff, affects the unit’s sustainability and 
capacity and also constitutes a risk to the confidentiality of the information that FIU has at its 
disposal. 
Finally, the absence of an independent budget for the unit’s operational costs, as well as its 
dependence on working guidelines received from above, affects its operational independence 
as this involves unnecessary bureaucracy during the process of requisitioning resources to carry 
out its work. 
Operationally, the FIU’s ability to exchange information with its stakeholders should be based 
on trust, a key ingredient for its effectiveness. However, in practice, the Rwandan FIU’s 
                                                          
103 Article 24 of the FIU Presidential Order. 
104 Article 3 of the FIU Presidential Order. 
105 Article 22 of the FIU Presidential Order. 
106 Article 21 of the FIU Presidential Order. 
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closeness to the National Police has the effect of discouraging reporting entities from disclosing 
information to the FIU out of fear that the information might come into the hands of the police 
who, in turn, could use it to investigate any other matter.  In fact, the FIU’s police officers are 
more involved in ordinary policing duties than in gathering and analysing intelligence on 
economic criminality. Quite apart from this, the officers are not trained to work as FIU officials. 
3.3.2 National Public Prosecutor Authority (NPPA) 
 
The NPPA has its main office in Kigali and has district offices in other areas. It is headed by the 
Prosecutor General, who is assisted by his deputy and six Public Prosecutors with national 
competence.  
 
The NPPA has a specific department in charge of economic and financial crimes.107 This 
department is mandated to investigate and to prosecute money laundering cases.  However, in 
all its time of existence, it has not managed to investigate and prosecute a single case of money 
laundering. 
3.3.3 Rwanda National Police (RNP): Economic and Financial Unit 
 
The National Police has a twin department to the FIU which deals with other financial crime 
cases such as corruption, embezzlement, financial fraud and bankruptcy. At the time of writing, 
this department has investigated only one case similar to a money laundering case which the 
prosecutor declined to prosecute for lack of sufficient evidence. 
                                                          
107 See the NPPA organizational structure at http://nppa.gov.rw/our-services/at-nppa-branches/ibyaha-
bimunga-ubukungu-bwigihugu/?L=1 (accessed on 29 August 2014). 
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3.3.4 The Office of the Ombudsman 
The Office of the Ombudsman was established by Article 182 of the Constitution. It is mandated 
to reinforce good governance in public and private institutions.108 In addition to its many other 
functions, this office is invested with various powers, including the powers of judicial police,109 
powers to request administrative sanctions,110 prosecutorial powers,111 bailiff’s powers,112 and 
the power to request judicial review.113 This office plays an important role in the fight against 
money laundering given its being a line institution in charge of anti-corruption and 
transparency, in general. 
3.3.5 Revenue Service: Investigation Department 
 
Another key player in the fight against the laundering of money associated with tax offences is 
the Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA), which also conducts investigations. Consisting of police 
officers, it has judicial powers to investigate tax cases and it cooperates with other customs 
agents regionally and internationally. Like other Rwandan law enforcement authorities, it has 
not yet investigated any money laundering case within its jurisdiction. 
 
                                                          
108 Gatera A and Ngilinshuti V Strengthening Good Governance in Rwanda: The Experience of the Office of the 
Ombudsman 9.  
109 Article 11 of  Law No. 76/2013 of 11 September 2013 determining the mission, powers, organisation and 
functioning of the Office of the Ombudsman (herein the Ombudsman Law). 
110 Article 9 of the Ombudsman Law. 
111 Article 13 of the Ombudsman Law. 
112 Article 16 of the Ombudsman Law. 
113 Article 15 of the Ombudsman Law. 
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3.4       Preventive Measures 
3.4.1 Preventive Measures in Financial institutions 
 
AML preventive measures in financial institutions are provided for in both the AML law and the 
Bank Law of 2008. Whereas the AML Law sets out preventive measures in general terms, the 
Bank Law contains specific regulations for banks in relation to combating money laundering. 
They relate to the prohibition of fictitious financial banks and anonymous accounts; customer 
identification; identification of owners; monitoring of suspicious transactions; record keeping; 
and how to deal with politically exposed persons (PEPs). 
 
3.4.1.1 Prohibition  of Fictitious Banks and Anonymous Accounts 
 
Generally, financial institutions intending to operate in Rwanda are required to be physically 
present in the country.114 In addition, they are obligated to cooperate with judicial authorities 
and the FIU by furnishing them with accurate information regarding their management, 
representation, and beneficial owners.115 This measure aims to enhance safety in the financial 
system and to prevent it from being abused for criminal purposes. 
 
For this reason, financial institutions are strictly prohibited from opening or maintaining 
anonymous accounts, or accounts with fictitious or incorrect names.116 Financial institutions are 
also proscribed from establishing business relationships with institutions with no physical 
presence in their home country, or banks suspected of operating anonymously.117 
                                                          
114 Article 9 Par 1 of the AML Law. 
115 Article 9 Par 3 of the AML Law. 
116 Article 9 Par 4 of the AML Law. 
117 Article 9 Par 2 of the AML Law. 
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3.4.1.2 Customer Identification 
 
In Rwanda, reporting entities, including financial institutions must identify their customers 
prior to and during business relationships.  They are required to identify and profile customers 
who execute occasional transactions exceeding the threshold set by the FIU, or those who 
conduct suspicious transactions such as the receipt of electronic transfers without originator 
information.118 
 
The customer identification process requires Rwandan citizens to identify themselves with their 
national identity card or passport, and legal persons must show their registration certificate and 
list of shareholders.119 Individuals acting on behalf of others are required to submit their power 
of attorney documents, as well as their national identity cards.120 
3.4.1.3  Beneficial Ownership 
According the AML Law, the reporting entities are required to identify the real owner of the 
business that is being conducted. In the case of transactions, financial institutions are required 
to establish by all means other unmentioned beneficiaries on behalf of whom the client is 
acting. In case of a persistent doubt, a reporting entity has to consider it as a reportable 
suspicious transaction, and take adequate steps to inform the FIU.121 
 
 
 
                                                          
118 Article 10 Par 1 of the AML Law. 
119 Article 10 Par 2 of the AML Law. 
120 Article 10 Par 3 of the AML Law. 
121 Article 14 of the AML Law. 
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3.4.1.4  Monitoring of Suspicious Transactions 
 
The reporting entities are required to monitor certain suspicious transactions. More specifically, 
they are required to pay special attention to all strange transactions or exceptionally large 
transactions which are apparently unjustifiable. Such transactions must be thoroughly 
examined, and once their origin and purpose are established, the findings must be reported to 
the FIU.122 Moreover, special attention is devoted to business relationships and transactions 
entered into with persons resident in or originating from countries known to have lax anti-
money laundering laws.123 
 
3.4.1.5 Record Keeping 
 
Reporting entities are required to keep records of transactions involving their customers or 
clients for at least 10 years, starting from the date the business relationship was terminated in 
the case of a regular customer, or the day on which the transaction was concluded in the case 
of an occasional customer.124 This period applies equally to both domestic and international 
transactions.125 
The requirement to keep records is also imposed on members of designated professions, such 
as lawyers. They are required to maintain account books and business correspondence for at 
                                                          
122 Article 15 Par 1 of the AML Law. 
123 Article 15 Par 2 of the AML Law. 
124 Article 17 Par 1 of the AML Law. 
125 Article 17 Par 2 of the AML Law. 
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least 10 years after the end of the business relationship.126  Stored records are exchanged solely 
upon the authorisation of the FIU.127 
3.4.1.6  Dealing with PEPs 
In the process of dealing with PEPs,  reporting entities must apply normal due diligence. They 
have to ensure that appropriate risk management systems exist for establishing whether the 
customer is a political leader, and they are duty bound to take reasonable measures to 
ascertain the source of the PEP’s wealth. Before establishing a business relationship with such a 
person, the employee dealing with the case must first obtain the approval of the employer and 
must undertake to conduct regular monitoring of the business relationship with such a client.128 
3.4.2 Preventive Measures in Designated Non-Financial Businesses and  Professions 
 
Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions are other business sectors exposed to the 
risk of being used as conduits by money launderers. They, too, are legally required to apply 
measures aimed at combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. They include 
lawyers in private practice, auditors and accountants, real estate agents, traders in objects of 
value such as precious metals, casinos, lottery agencies, and gaming halls. All these businesses 
are implicitly included as reporting entities which are subject to AML requirements by virtue of 
their owners and managers being individually subjected to AML requirements.129 
                                                          
126 Article 17 Par 3 of the AML Law. 
127 Article 17 Par 4 of the AML Law. 
128 Article 16 of the AML Law. 
129 Article 3 of the AML Law. 
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Like other reporting entities, DNFBPs are supervised by the FIU in matters relating to 
compliance with all AML/CFT obligations.130 However, the FIU’s lack of powers to impose 
sanctions on DNFBPs is problematic. 
3.4.2.1 Lawyers 
 
Lawyers in private practice are subjected to AML reporting requirements when they represent 
or assist their clients.131 However, they are not obliged to submit a suspicious transaction 
report to the FIU if this obligation would override legal professional privilege.132 
Lawyers are required to uphold professional secrecy in all their dealings with clients or with 
other lawyers on behalf of a client.133 In exceptional circumstances, when a lawyer is required 
to do so, he/she may convey the confidential information only to the ethics committee of the 
lawyers’ association.134  
Breach of professional secrecy is otherwise punishable by the Penal Code with two months’ to 
three years’ imprisonment and/or a maximum fine of 50 000 Rwandan francs. In addition, 
someone found guilty of such an offence may be barred from holding public office for a period 
of up to 10 years.135 
                                                          
130 Article 13 of the FIU Presidential Order. 
131 See article 3 Par 3 of the AML Law. It provides a list of activities where lawyers are required to abide by 
AML requirements. 
132 Article 8 Par 2 of the AML Law. 
133 Article 54 Par 1 of the Rwandan Bar Law. 
134 Article 54 of the Rwandan Bar Law. 
135 Article 214 of the Penal Code of Rwanda. 
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Given the constraints placed on lawyers with regard to divulging information they receive from 
clients, they will, in practice, be reluctant to divulge information to the FIU, especially because 
of the danger that the information could be used for purposes for which it was not intended.  
3.4.2.2 Legal Persons and Non-Profit Organisations 
Legal persons may be either companies or cooperatives. Companies are registered by the 
Rwandan Development Board while cooperatives are registered under the Rwanda Cooperative 
Agency. Whereas cooperatives deal mainly with the rural population, companies deal also with 
international investors, whom they welcome, but amongst whom might also be money 
launderers pretending to be honourable business people or entrepreneurs. 
As pointed out above, the Rwandan government has devised a range of incentives to attract 
foreign businesses to the country. Amongst these is the speedy registration of companies, 
which can take place in just six hours.136 Once the registration certificate is issued, it serves as a 
conclusive evidence that the company is lawfully incorporated,137 which also means that the 
holder of the certificate may open a bank account without further ado. 
Rwandan non-profit organisations (NPOs) are divided into three categories, namely national 
non-governmental organisations, international non-governmental organisations, and the 
religious-based organisations.  Each category of NPO is governed by its specific enabling law. 
However, Rwanda does not have full control over the financial operations of NPOs, as they 
                                                          
136 Rwanda Development Board RDB Client Charter (2013) 3, available at 
http://www.rdb.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/Documents/Docs/RDB_Client_Service_Charter_01.pdf 
(accessed on 3 September 2014). 
137 Article 17 of the Company Law. 
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enjoy administrative and financial autonomy.138 It is a matter of concern that this financial 
freedom could be abused by launderers who could very well regard it as an opportunity to 
dodge what they consider to be invasive and unnecessary state interventions. 
3.5 Customer Due Diligence (CDD) 
 
The obligation placed upon reporting entities to apply CDD is imposed by Article 10 of the AML 
Law. It applies equally to all reporting entities and requires all reporting entities, including 
financial institutions and DNFBPs, to identify the customer before establishing any business 
relationship or whenever the customer executes an occasional transaction exceeding the 
threshold amount set by the FIU. 
All reporting entities are further obliged to pay attention to all complex or unusual patterns of 
transactions with no clear purpose. They must examine the background of or circumstances 
attending such transactions and must report their findings to the FIU.139 
However, the laws and directives governing the application of the risk-based approach to 
customer due diligence do not distinguish between the following forms of customer due 
diligence: enhanced due diligence (EDD); normal due diligence (NDD); and simplified due 
diligence (SDD). The application of the risk-based approach is left to the discretion of reporting 
entities, which may disregard their obligation to apply it, simply because of the high premium 
they place on making maximum profits.  
                                                          
138 Article 10 of the Law Governing National Nongovernmental Organisation; Article 3 of Law Governing 
International Nongovernmental Organisation; Article 7 of the Law on Religious-Based Organisations. 
139 Article 15 of the AML Law. 
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Another problem regarding the application of CDD is the rising criminal use of new technology. 
The non-face-to-face business relationships pose a potential money laundering risk, as 
launderers transacting small amounts may go undetected. It is of special concern in Rwanda 
due to the lack of strategies to deal with cyber laundering. 
3.6 Cooperation  
 
As stated above, cooperation is essential for the effective combating of ML, given its 
transnational character.140  In this context, Rwanda has developed two channels of cooperation: 
domestic cooperation and international cooperation. 
3.6.1 Domestic Cooperation 
 
Although the Rwandan AML Law does not openly provide for domestic cooperation, the 
diversity of representatives in the advisory board of the FIU is considered to be an adequate 
domestic forum to ensure some level of domestic cooperation, even though it is not the 
board’s main task to do this.141 
Some degree of cooperation does take place amongst individual institutions and organisations. 
In addition, some forms of cooperation have been observed between individual institutions. 
The strong ties between the FIU and other institutions such as the National Bank, the 
prosecution service, the revenue services and all reporting entities have helped it to forge 
common approaches in combating ML. Some form of cooperation exists between non-profit 
organisations and their regulator, namely the Rwanda Governance Board.  
                                                          
140 Stessens G (2000) 252. 
141   Article 19 of the FIU Presidential Order. 
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However, in the business sector, the level of cooperation is still low, given the existing risk of 
that businesses may be used for laundering purposes. 
3.6.2 International Cooperation 
 
Rwanda understands the need for international cooperation in the fight against transnational 
organised crime, including money laundering. It is in this context that it cooperates with other 
states in matters relating to the exchange of information, investigation and the implementation 
of provisional measures, all of which it does through the channel of bilateral and multilateral  
cooperation agreements.142 
 
However, there are instances where Rwanda may refuse cooperation, mostly in cases where 
cooperation is likely to prejudice public order, national security or the fundamental principles of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda.143  
Thus, Rwanda may  decline a request for cooperation for several reasons: if the matter involved 
is not considered as a crime in Rwanda,  if the requesting authority does not have competence 
to do so under the law of the requesting state,  if the case has been disposed of by the 
Rwandan criminal justice system, if the requested measures are not accepted or applicable in 
Rwanda, if the person affected had not been legally represented, or if the prosecution is based 
on sex, religion, nationality or is  politically motivated.144 
 
                                                          
142 Article 28 of the AML Law. 
143  Article 30 of the AML Law. 
144 Article 30 of the AML Law. 
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3.6.3 Mutual Legal Assistance  
 
Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) is part of the package of international cooperation to support 
the prosecution and punishment of individuals suspected of money laundering.145 As part of its 
international obligations, Rwanda provides MLA in specific areas, upon the necessary 
requirements being fulfilled. 
Concerning the scope of assistance, Rwanda cooperates in matters relating to the collection of 
evidence, exchange of judicial documents, facilitation of on-site visits during case preparation, 
requests for the implementation of provisional measures,146 the recovery of assets,147 and any 
other matter that would help the requesting state bring suspected money launderers to the 
courts to be put on trial. 
 
In terms of requirements set out by the AML Law for successful MLA, the request should be 
clear and concise and should not only relate to the agreed upon cooperation148 but should also 
abide by the transmission procedure.149 Once the request is accepted and processed, Rwanda 
requires that the content be treated in confidence,150 and parties to the MLA process are 
prohibited from using bits of evidence for purposes other than the purpose for which the 
                                                          
145 Stessens G (2000) 254. 
146 Article 33 of the AML Law. 
147 Article 40 of the AML Law. 
148 Article 42 of the AML Law. 
149 Article 41 of the AML Law. Generally, the Requests for MLA are transmitted through diplomatic channels. 
In urgent cases, however, a request may be communicated through INTERPOL or directly by the foreign 
authorities to the judicial authorities in Rwanda, either by mail, or any other faster means of 
communication. 
150 Article 45 of the AML law. 
 
 
 
 
 52 
 
evidence was provided.151 Finally, the expenses incurred in the execution of a MLA process are 
borne by the requesting state, unless agreed otherwise. 
3.6.4 Membership in International and Regional Bodies 
 
International and regional bodies can together serve as a forum for effective cooperation in the 
fight against the ever increasing and widespread crime of money laundering. In this context, it 
is vital for Rwanda to join other countries in this fight and be able to enjoy membership benefits 
ranging from the exchange of best practices to regular peer reviews. At present, Rwanda is not 
affiliated to any such organisation. The Rwandan FIU is not even a member of the Egmont 
Group, the international organisation that co-ordinates the work of financial intelligence units 
around the world. Thus far, Rwanda enjoys only observer status at meetings of the Eastern and 
Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESSAMLG). 
3.7       Impediments to Prosecution of Money Laundering In Rwanda 
3.7.1 Overview 
 
The prosecution of money laundering is considerably more difficult than other economic crimes 
due to its organised nature, its use of sophisticated techniques and the ability of criminals to 
engage the services of professional advisors such as lawyers and accountants. In addition to its 
difficulty, it is impeded by lack of people with the required skills to deal with the complexity and 
sophistication of money laundering in Rwanda. 
 
                                                          
151 Article 46 of the AML Law. 
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This section discusses practical impediments to the prosecution of money laundering cases in 
Rwanda as submitted by the NPPA (herein stated challenges) , on one hand, and the apparent  
shortcomings observed in the prosecution system as a whole by the outsider (herein the 
observed challenges) on the other hand. 
3.7.2 Stated Challenges in Prosecuting Money Laundering 
 
The following challenges were advanced by the NPPA, as hindering its efforts to effectively 
prosecute the crime of money laundering: 
3.7.2.1 Absence of Precedence  
 
The Rwandan NPPA has been pretexting absence of a precedent case to kick-start the process. 
However, the genuineness of this reason is questionable, given the fact that there will never be  
a prosecution specifically aimed at paving the way for further prosecutions of money 
laundering.  
Admittedly, a case may enhance experience and pave the way for the rest of the prosecutors to 
apply the AML legal framework. However, the absence of precedent ML case is nothing other 
than a scapegoat behind which prosecutors are hiding their incompetence in matters of ML. 
They should understand that prosecution is a key tool without which all AML mechanisms may 
be in vain. Its absence is a signal to the launderers that the domestic structures are not ready 
and able, and thus a motivation for them to continue their criminal acts. 
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In brief, as long as launderers are not successfully prosecuted for their criminal deeds or are 
allowed to live off the profit of their illegal activities, the work of the FIU and other law 
enforcement authorities involved in AML shall continue to be considered insignificant. 
 
3.7.2.2 Lack of Resources 
 
Another major challenge not only to the prosecution of money laundering in Rwanda is its 
entailed costs. In fact, Rwanda faces resource constraints in many sectors and AML costs 
competes with many other more pressing public issues that need funding. The resources 
needed are meant to cover all operational costs such as the costs to establish necessary 
infrastructure and skills development. 
3.7.3 Observed Challenges of Prosecuting Money laundering 
 
The following challenges are observed from an outsider perspective as impeding the effective 
prosecution of the crime of money laundering: 
 
3.7.3.1 Legal Impediments 
 
The legal impediments to prosecute money laundering in Rwanda are primarily based on the 
lack of clarity about the criminalisation approach to adopt. As a result of this confusion, many 
cases which would give rise to money laundering go unchecked.  
In addition, there is an ongoing debate over the criminalisation of self-laundering152 as a 
separate prosecutable offence. In fact, Rwandan judges have expressed their concerns stating 
                                                          
152 Self-laundering is a criminal state where the offender who commits a predicate offence ‘deals with’ the 
proceeds of offending himself or herself. 
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that criminalising self-laundering is a violation of the ne bis in idem principle. According to 
them, the laundering of proceeds, when done by the author of the predicate offence, should be 
inclusive in the predicate offence itself.  For this reason, they require a specific intent (dolus 
specialis) to launder or conceal the proceeds,153 a requirement which is inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Palermo Convention of 2002. The difficulty in proving the special intent as 
required by the court constitutes an impediment to the prosecution of money laundering. 
3.7.3.2 Lack of Skilled Staff, Equipment and Technical Capacity 
 
As already noted, the fight against ML requires far more than just the creation of enabling 
legislation and the setting up of the necessary implementation structures. It is also important to 
build the capacity of agencies so that they understand the content and scope of application of 
the legislation, how the mechanisms in place should work, and the role that each institution 
should play in AML.  
 
In Rwanda, ML is a new area of law where lack of qualified human resources is particularly 
severe.154 First, the lack of investigation skills in this area results in cases being rejected on 
grounds of insufficient evidence.155 Second, the deficient knowledge of AML legislation on the 
                                                          
153 Durrieu R Rethinking Money Laundering & Financing of Terrorism in International Law: Towards a New 
Global Legal Order (2013) 243. 
154 Alessandra F and Pedro  P ‘Using money laundering investigations to fight corruption in developing 
countries Domestic obstacles and strategies to overcome them’(2012) U4 Issue 10, available at 
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/Downloads/copy%20of%20impedimen
ts%20and%20concl.pdf  (accessed on 7 October 2014). 
155   CIGI, Rwanda: Security Rector reform (2012) 4, available at 
http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/04/Country-Profile-Rwanda-April-7.pdf 
(accessed on 10 October 2014). 
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side of prosecutors and judges prevents them from making better use of the opportunities 
provided by this law.156 
 
 Investigators and prosecutors focus more on the predicate offence where they typically 
consider criminal proceeds as evidence to prove the occurrence of predicate offence and not a 
specific case of money laundering. 
 
The problematic shortage of skills within the FIU is in some part caused by the structure and 
nature of the work where staff are subjected to frequent transfers,157 an act which not only 
affects the human resource development of the FIU, but also  its operations.158  
3.7.3.3  Lack of Familiarity with AML Laws in the Reporting Entities 
 
Reporting entities do not have same understanding of their role in the implementation of the 
AML Law. Many of them believe that it is solely a FIU duty to implement the law by collecting 
necessary intelligence which it uses as evidence in court, while others, mostly the foreign 
banks, are still following guidelines from their countries of origin.159  Being profit-minded, 
especially when the transaction involves big money, reporting entities opt to turn a blind eye to 
their obligations, which results into obstructing the necessary cooperation for effective 
prosecution of money laundering cases.160 
                                                          
156   US Department of States International Narcotics Control Strategy Report on Rwanda (2014) 6, available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/supplemental/227996.html (accessed on 15 October 2014). 
157   Articles 23 and 25 of the Presidential Order establishing a specific statute for Police Personnel 
158   Gwintsa N ‘Challenges of establishing financial intelligence units’ in Goredema C (ed) Money Laundering 
Experiences: A Survey (2006) 61. 
159   Agutamba K ‘Loopholes for Money Laundering exposed’ The Rwanda Focus 1 October 2012. Available at 
http://focus.rw/wp/2012/10/loopholes-for-money-laundering-exposed/ (accessed on 11 October 2014).  
160   Agutamba K (2012) 3. 
 
 
 
 
 57 
 
3.7.3.4 The Indirect Effect of ML Prosecutions on Business Opportunities 
 
Even though the intent of a country may not be to shield international criminals from 
prosecution, it is important to understand that a poor country like Rwanda may hesitate to 
enforce fully AML frameworks including prosecution, mostly when it is established that such a 
move would have an indirect effect on the national economy, such as loss of business, 
employment and tax opportunities. It is provided that such state’s interests, vested in 
suspicious businesses, may influence its implementation of the AML system. In other words, a 
state cannot prioritise the prosecutions of conduct which, in reality, is a driving force for its 
economy.161 
3.8 General Observations on the Effectiveness of ML Responses in Rwanda 
 
The Rwandan AML Law appears to be comprehensive and packaged  to deal with the threats of 
Money laundering.  Its areas of strengths include the criminalisation of ML and international 
cooperation where strategic aspects are well captured, including a wide range of MLA as 
required by main international legal instruments such as article 18 of the Palermo Convention 
of 2000 and article 46 of UNCAC. 
In addition, it has provided for the principle of dual criminality to protect ML fugitives from 
unjust punishment and the principle of speciality to ensure that a person can be prosecuted 
only for the charges on which they were extradited and that evidence obtained through 
                                                          
161 Castle A and Joanne L ‘Money laundering and corruption in the Asia Pacific’ (1999) International Centre for 
Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy 8, available at 
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/Paper4.PDF (accessed on 24 August 2014). 
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international cooperation may not be used for purposes and proceedings other than those for 
which the cooperation was requested. 
The third positive aspect covered in the AML law is the consideration of the principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare to ensure that the criminals will not escape justice and find safe haven on 
the basis of nationality. 
However, the existence of a well packaged law on anti-money laundering did not remove the 
challenges observed in practice. In fact, this law was brought in as a “legal transplant”, far from 
being self-executing. Even the financial investigation unit, which would coordinate the 
implementation of this law, came into force three years following the enabling act.162 
The delay in operationalising the AML Law has led to an understanding that the adoption of an 
AML Law in Rwanda was not based on a social problem necessitating a legal solution, but rather 
was an international requirement which local authorities knew very little about. Lack of 
knowledge and ownership has created reduced enforcement efforts which have led to 
significant discrepancies between the legal theories as they appear in the AML Law and the 
operational reality on the ground. 
As an illustration of this situation, the AML Law has provided for a fund to support activities 
relating to crime prevention. This fund is supposed to use confiscated proceeds of crime as its 
operational funds. But, as of the time of writing, this fund has not been established and it 
remains a question as to how confiscated proceeds of crime are managed.  
                                                          
162 The FIU Presidential Order came into force in 2011, whereas the enabling law had been adopted in 2008.   
 
 
 
 
 59 
 
Even after noticing the need to have an AML mechanism in place, authorities were hindered by 
the existence of two approaches regarding the criminalisation of money laundering. The 
confusion over the applicable approach, coupled with other practical challenges, has led the 
law enforcement authorities to become increasingly reluctant to investigate money laundering 
as a specific scheme compared to the predicate offence.  
Moreover, the law only recognises a single mental element, the knowledge of unlawfulness. 
This flies in the face of the 1989 Vienna Convention and UNCAC of 2003, which provide that 
knowledge, intent or purpose, may be inferred from other objective factual circumstances.163 
The law has basic shortcomings regarding its provisional measures compared to the FATF 
recommendations. The difference is not only in the legal wording of the text, but also in regard 
to the civil procedure itself. The full implementation of AML laws remains a worry, as Rwanda 
lacks qualified and well-trained officials to deal with the crime of money laundering. 
It is therefore the author’s view that Rwanda is not doing enough to help fight money 
laundering both locally and at the transnational level. However, the existing political will to do 
more offers a glimmer of hope. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
163  Article 28 of UNCAC and Article 3(3) of the Vienna Convention. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.  
 
 
4.1 General Conclusion 
 
 
The purpose of this paper was to assess the effectiveness of ML responses adopted by Rwanda 
by measuring them against international AML frameworks such as the FATF recommendations 
of 2012. 
 
As already demonstrated in Chapters One and Two, Rwanda ranks among the poorest countries 
on the globe. Its main strategy to fight poverty is to position itself as an investment-friendly 
nation. However, this hospitality and enthusiasm to do business may present a golden 
opportunity for criminals who intend to launder their money through different investment 
schemes in Rwanda. 
 
While money laundering is globally perceived as an operational risk affecting the foundations of 
national development,164 it has an additional negative effect on Rwanda as it poses a threat to 
the state’s reputation, which is key for its  development.  
 
In this paper, Rwanda’s legal and institutional frameworks were evaluated to see if really 
Rwanda can stand the ever-growing transnational threat of money laundering.  
                                                          
164 Goredema C ‘Tracing Proceeds of Crime in Southern Africa: Challenges and Milestones’ in Goredema C 
(ed) Money Laundering Experiences: A Survey (2006) 121. 
 
 
 
 
 61 
 
In Chapter Three, it was submitted that laws enacted aspired to meet almost all international 
standards. However, lack of consensus on the applicable approach to criminalise money 
laundering and  the judicial disregard of ML as a stand-alone offence have emerged as practical 
challenges  in the implementation of the AML law.  
Interestingly, the current Government has shown a strong political will to combat all forms of 
criminality. It has given due consideration to the fact that development achievements  so far 
recorded may be tarnished by opportunistic criminals, who may use the infrastructures in place 
as vehicles for money laundering. 
This work has also attempted to sketch some of the impediments to the prosecution of crimes 
of money laundering in Rwanda.  
In the effort to establish whether Rwanda as a developing country can meet AML requirements 
that are placed on it given its limited resources, capacity and expertise, this research has 
provided practical and realistic recommendations for a more effective AML framework. 
4.2 General Recommendations 
 
As above mentioned, the effectiveness of Rwandan AML framework requires three main 
responses, namely, tackling the enforcement deficit, restructuring the leadership and the 
functioning of the FIU and, finally, refining public awareness and cooperation in matters 
relating to money laundering.  
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4.2.1 Confronting the Enforcement Deficit 
 
One of the most contentious and enduring problems in the fight against money laundering is 
the existing gap between the text of the law and the practice. It is a gap that has made it 
difficult to prosecute money laundering cases. Not a single case has been successfully 
prosecuted so far, despite a multitude of economic crime cases being lodged every year. The 
following suggestions are submitted to close this gap. 
4.2.1.1 The Necessity to Eliminate All Identified Legal Deficiencies 
One of the means to combat the enforcement deficit is to eliminate all identified legal 
deficiencies which may render the implementation of the Rwanda’s AML regime ineffective. In 
particular, the Penal Code and AML Law should be harmonised in order to have a consistent 
approach to criminalising ML.  
Second, enforcement mechanisms should be put in place to improve the level of compliance. 
This includes the active application of preventive measures and the provision of a wide range of 
proportional and effective sanctions for those who fail to comply with the AML laws. In this 
context, the FIU should be given the power to impose sanctions such as fines and provisional 
closures.165 
 
 
                                                          
165 Such measures may allow the FIU to aggressively act against  non-bank financial services and the DNFBP  
sectors, and  improve the level of  compliance with AML/CFT requirements. 
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4.2.1.2 The Need for a Comprehensive Implementation Strategy 
It has been submitted that the FIU’s poor strategic implementation of the AML regime is linked 
to the lack of predetermined objectives with clear performance indicators. In fact, even the FIU 
action plan is not reflected in the general RNP strategic plan of 2009-2013.166 The FIU should 
therefore cooperate with other relevant stakeholders in developing a comprehensive 
implementation strategy indicating Rwanda’s strategic responses to ML risks. 
4.2.1.3 The Need to Expand Skilled Human Resources and Technical Capacity 
Rwanda is advised to allocate resources to strengthen knowledge and skills for individuals 
working in the AML sector, such as the FIU members, regulators, public prosecutors, the 
judiciary  and the law enforcement, and to provide them with adequate equipment  such as 
computer software, vehicles and surveillance equipment to enable them to perform their AML 
functions effectively.  
 Where possible, some of these efforts should be extended to staff of private sector institutions 
with reporting obligations, especially in sectors most vulnerable to ML. Despite budget 
constraints, many of these needs may be solved through strategic cooperation with other 
states, or through funds collected from the confiscated criminal proceeds, as indicated in the 
AML Law.167   
 
 
                                                          
166   Rwanda National Police Strategic Plan 2009-2013.  
167 Article 61 of the AML Law. 
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4.2.2 Restructuring the Leadership and Functioning of FIU 
 
 
As mentioned above, the FIU  is overburdened by its many duties which an institution 
established to do the work it is supposed to do can ill-afford. It is for this reason that the 
following suggestions are made to make the Rwandan FIU more effective, and thus 
professional. 
 
4.2.2.1 The Necessity to Delegate Powers 
 
The FIU is advised to focus on a coordination role and delegate some of its other policing duties 
to the ordinary law enforcement agencies. In fact, conducting additional investigations 
concurrently with other police units could jeopardise the confidentiality of the information 
being investigated and lead to the tipping off of the reported persons before they are 
apprehended. 
 
4.2.2.2 The Need to Revisit the Appointment Procedure of the Head of FIU 
Special provisions relating to the appointment and dismissal of the head of the FIU need to be 
established so that the discretion given to the National Police Authority to appoint or dismiss 
personnel may not affect the autonomy of the FIU. It is recommended that the appointment of 
the head of the FIU be done through a process that upholds his or her autonomy in a more 
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formalised and solemn way168 in order to create a sense of responsibility, acceptability, and 
respect on the part of the reporting entities. 
4.2.2.3 Independence of the FIU 
As above discussed, the Rwandan FIU is not completely independent as it is attached to the 
National Police. Tied to this is the issue of independence from political influence or abuse in the 
carrying out of its duties.169  With respect to Recommendation 26 of the FATF, it is therefore 
recommended that the Rwandan FIU be given some level of autonomy to ensure that 
confidentiality is imposed around all information it receives. This will enable it to gain the trust 
of reporting authorities. 
4.2.3 Refining Public Awareness and Cooperation in AML Matters 
 
The fight against money laundering cannot be won without effective domestic and 
international cooperation. Domestically, Rwanda is encouraged to establish a mechanism for 
public awareness of the crimes of money laundering through the involvement of the media and 
all other actors who may play a crucial role in fostering public discussion on money laundering 
and its negative impact.  
 
Rwanda is further advised to take a step towards becoming a member of ESAAMLG and the 
Egmont Group for their importance in building operational ties, including regular mutual 
evaluation and exchange of information and expertise. 
                                                          
168 International Monetary Fund and World Bank Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview (2004) 9, available 
at http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/3DAC2825-5A9F-46C2-94C2-
6199EEDB20FA/7885/FIUHandbook_English.pdf (accessed on 5 September 2014). 
169 Gwintsa N (2006) 50. 
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In sum, the recommendations cited above are meant to address different sorts of deficiencies 
observed in the Rwanda’s responses to money laundering. The author of this research ends 
with the optimism that once the above recommendations are implemented, the AML regime 
will become strong enough to pre-empt and respond to AML threats. 
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